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Note

When Does a Buyer Become a

Buyer in Ordinary Course? U.C.C.
§§ 1-201(9), 9-307(1): A Test and
a Proposal
I. INTRODUCTION
Under section 9-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code' a security interest 2 in inventory 3 is effective between the parties to a se1. The Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter referred to as Code] has been
enacted by all states except Louisiana. Article 9 covers all transactions
where debts are secured by personal property with certain exclusions under
§ 9-104. In 1972, substantial amendments to article 9 were prepared by the
Review Committee for Article 9, appointed by the Permanent Editorial Board
of the Uniform Commercial Code. See D. EPsTEiN & J. LANDERS,DEBTORS AND
CREDrrORS 173-74 (1978). The Nebraska Legislature adopted these amendments during the 1980 legislative session. Act of Mar. 13, 1980, L.B. 621, 1980
Neb. Laws 337. However, the substance of this note is unaffected by the adoption of the 1972 version of article 9. Unless otherwise indicated, all references
are to the 1972 version of article 9 rather than the 1962 version.
2. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) defines a security interest as:
[A]n interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation
of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to
the buyer (Section 2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest." The term also includes any interest of a buyer of
accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9. The special
property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of such goods
to a contract for sale under Section 2-401 is not a "security interest,"
but a buyer may also acquire a "security interest" by complying with
Article 9....
3. "Inventory" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-109 as follows:
Goods are
(4) "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them for
sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has
so furnished them, or if they are raw materials, work in process or
materials used or consumed in a business. Inventory of a person is
not to be classified as his equipment.
While South Omaha Production Credit Ass'n v. Tyson, Inc., 189 Neb. 702,
204 N.W.2d 806 (1973) suggests that the definition of buyer in the ordinary
course of business under U.C.C. § 9-307(1) ordinarily restricts the application
of § 9-307(1) to a purchase from inventory, there is no express language in
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curity agreement against purchasers of the collateral and
creditors. However, under the massive exception to this general
provision contained in section 9-307(1),4 a buyer in the ordinary

course5 of the seller's business takes the goods free of the security
interest even if perfected 6 and "even though the buyer knows of its
existence." 7 The protections afforded the buyer in ordinary course

4.

5.

6.

7.

U.C.C. § 1-201(9) which provides that the application of § 9-307(1) is limited to
security interests in inventory. However, the requirement of U.C.C. § 1201(9) that a buyer buy from "a person in the business of selling goods of that
kind," suggests that such goods will typically be inventory of the seller.
U.C.C. § 9-307(1) provides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1201) other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest created
by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and even
though the buyer knows of its existence.
One commentator has stated that in light of the extreme limitation placed
on U.C.C. § 9-201 by U.C.C. § 9-307(1), a perfected security interest would be
more appropriately called a "semi-security." Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary
Course of Business under Article 9 of the Uniform CommercialCode (andRelated Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1.
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) defines buyer in ordinary course of business as:
[A] person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to
him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a
third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the
business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. All persons who sell minerals or the like (including oil and
gas) at wellhead or minehead shall be deemed to be persons in the
business of selling goods of that kind. "Buying" may be for cash or
by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured credit and
includes receiving goods or documents of title under a pre-existing
contract for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security
for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
The issue of "buyer in ordinary course" arises under U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2)
and 9-307(1). Although § 2-403 applies to sales of "entrusted" goods, both sections provide for the cutting off of third party property interests by buyers in
the ordinary course of a seller's business and thus decisions under either section are analogous.
No distinction is drawn here for § 9-307(1) purposes between purchase
money and ordinary security interests. The special protections afforded a
buyer in ordinary course under § 9-307(1) do not depend on a secured party's
status as a purchase money financer.
Perfection of a security interest is generally achieved by filing a proper
financing statement in the appropriate place or places. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9401 to -404. The clearest definition of "perfection" in the Code is contained in
U.C.C. § 9-303 and Official Comment 1. Generally, under article 9, one set of
rules governs filing (U.C.C. §§ 9-401 to -407) and one set governs the enforcement of the security interest (U.C.C §§ 9-501 to -507).
Where the security interest is not perfected the buyer takes free of the
security interest regardless of the nature of the transaction. U.C.C. § 9-301(1).
U.C.C. § 9-307(1). The fact that a buyer has knowledge of a third party's security interest in purchased goods will not affect his status as a buyer in ordinary course. However, he will have failed the good faith requirement of
U.C.C. § 1-201(a) if he is aware that the sale is in violation of the ownership
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under section 9-307(1) are based on notions of fairness and commercial utility.8 Where an innocent buyer has relied on his seller's
apparent authority to sell the goods, it is thought that such a purchaser has the right to avoid being harassed by his seller's inventory financer. 9 Furthermore, where goods serving as loan
collateral are held for sale,10 the seller must be given the power to

sell if he is to meet the obligations imposed under the financing
agreement.
The question of whether goods have been sold to a buyer in ordinary course is critical to a determination of the rights in the collateral of the buyer and the secured party. Where goods have been
sold to a buyer in ordinary course, the secured party cannot exerrights of a third party and has not been authorized. See, e.g., Correria v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 235 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); International
Harvester v. Glendenning, 505 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); J. WHirE &R.
SuMMRSP, UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE 145 (2d ed. 1980). "Good faith" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(19) as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."
J. WErr & R SummERS, supra, at 1067, list six conditions which a buyer
must meet in order to take goods serving as collateral for a loan free from a
prior perfected security interest:
(1) He must be a buyer in ordinary course,
(2) Who does not buy in bulk and does not take his interest as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing debt
(that is, he must give some form of 'new value'),
(3) Who buys from one in the business of selling goods of that kind
(that is, cars from a car dealer, i.e., inventory),
(4) Who buys in good faith and without knowledge that his
purchase is in violation of others' ownership rights or security
interests, and
(5) Does not buy farm products from a person engaged in farming
operations, and
(6) The competing security interest must be one created by his
seller.
See also, Cunningham v. Camelot Motors, Inc., 138 N.J. Super. 489, 351 A.2d
402 (1975) (listing a four part test). For a general discussion of buyer in ordinary course of business problems, see Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 11 (1978).
8. Skilton, supra note 4, at 3.
9. Id. at 3, 4, 88.
10. Where a security interest is retained in goods held for sale, the secured party
often holds what is referred to as a '"Toating lien," (or "continuing general
lien" or "floating charge") where the lien "floats as to the property subject to
the lien and the amount of debt secured thereby." D. EPSTEIN &J. LANDERS,
supra note 1, at 194. The authors state:
The debt secured may fluctuate from little to much or vice versa, and
the collateral covered may include all of the personal property which
the debtor from time to time owns, or all of a certain class or classes
of that property, including assets not owned at the time the lien is
created.
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cise foreclosure and sale remedies" against the defaulting seller's
inventory to satisfy the seller's debt.12 On the other hand, if goods
are sold to one who does not qualify as a buyer in ordinary course,
the buyer has no claim to the seller's inventory and will be forced
to recover any prior payments of the purchase price on the same
basis as the seller's general creditors.' 3
Section 9-307(l) presents two questions to the financer with a
perfected security interest in inventory and to the purchaser of
such inventory.14 The first is: who qualifies as a "buyer in ordinary course of business"? To this question section 1-201(9) supplies a fairly manageable definition.15 The second and much more
difficult question is: at what point during the sequence of an ordinary sales transaction is the status of "buyer" to be determined?16
11. When the seller is in default, part 5 of article 9 gives the secured party the
following cumulative remedies:
(1) Foreclose its security interest under the state's non-Code foreclosure law-9-501(1)
(2) Use real estate mortgage procedure when both realty and personalty are involved-9-501(4)
(3) Apply any special remedies provided in the security agreement-9-501(l), 9-501(2)
(4) Take judgment and levy execution on any non-exempt property*
of the debtor-9-501(1), 9-501(5)
(5) Collect accounts and instruments that are coUateral-9-501(2),
9-502
(6) Foreclose security interest under Code procedure-9-501(2), 9503, 9-504, 9-505
D. EPSTEiN &J. LANDERS, supra note 1, at 209. See notes 63-66 & accompanying text infra.
12. Where a secured party seizes and sells inventory which has been sold to a
buyer in ordinary course of business, the secured party will be liable to the
buyer in a conversion action. See, e.g, Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey
Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1979); Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile America
Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 580 P.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1978); Herman v. First Farmers State
Bank, 73 Ml. App. 3d 475,392 N.E.2d 344 (1979); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp,
56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.2d 525 (App. Div. 1968).
13. Note, The U.C.C. and An Insolvent Seller's Possesionof Goods Sold, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 91, 93 (1955).
14. For a concise statement of the problem, see MANAGEMENT REPORTS, 14 UmNFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAw LETTER, No. 4 (June 1980).
15. See note 5 supra.
16. It has been suggested that the question of whether one is a "buyer" within
the meaning of U.C.C. § 1-201(9) arises only rarely. J. WErrE &R. SUMMERS,
supra note 7, at 1067-68 n.82. However, the number of courts confronted with
the problem in the past decade suggests that the question is far from entirely
academic. See, e.g, Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Natl Bank, 612 F.2d
745 (3d Cir. 1979); Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile America Corp., 119 Ariz. 176,
580 P.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1978); O'Neill v. Barnett Bank, 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Services Co., 133 Ga. App. 488,211 S.E.2d 430 (1974); Troy Lumber Co. v. Williams,
124 Ga. App. 636, 185 S.E.2d 580 (1971); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank,
73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 392 N.E.2d 344 (1979); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:848

Or to state it another way, precisely when has a purchaser sufficiently completed the process of "buying" to achieve buyer in ordinary course status and take free of the secured party's interest in
the goods? To this question the language of section 1-201(9) is
much less helpful,' 7 except perhaps for its use of the terms
"buyer"'8 and "sale".19 Beyond20 this, the Code has relegated the
question to judicial innovation.
The most often applied alternatives for determining the point at
which a buyer achieves ordinary course status include: (1) the initial contract date, (2) the identification date, or (3) the title date;
however, other possibilities include: (4) the delivery date, and
(5) the acceptance date as provided in section 2-606.
This Note will examine the decisions adopting the various alternatives for determining when a sale has progressed sufficiently to
establish buyer in ordinary course status. An interpretational test
under the present Code, and a Code amendment will be proposed
for the determination of when a buyer becomes a buyer in ordi-

17.

18.
19.
20.

Bank-Western, 90 Misc.2d 868, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1977); Chrysler Credit Corp.
v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1968); Levine v. Ficke, 5 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1059 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); Medico Leasing Co. v. Smith, 457 P.2d 548
(Okla. 1969) (entrustment decision); DePaulo v. Williams Chevrolet-Cadillac,
Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600 (Lebanon, Pa. C. P. 1966) (entrustment decision);
Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973).
One court criticized the definitional language of U.C.C. § 1-201(9) as follows:
"[I]t is unfortunate that the Code defines 'buyer in ordinary course' by using
the exact words to be defined. By saying that a buyer in ordinary course is
one who buys in ordinary course, the phrase seems redundant and thus
meaningless." Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745,
753 (3d Cir. 1979).
U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (a) defines the term "buyer" as "a person who buys or contracts to buy goods."
U.C.C. § 2-106(1) defines "sale" as "the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price."
Generally, whether a buyer has purchased in the ordinary course is a question of both fact and law which considers all the surrounding circumstances
of the sale. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Glendenning, 505 S.W.2d
320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); J. WH=TE & R. SuMMERs supra note 7, at 145. This
question typically involves an inquiry into only the nature of the transaction
in order to determine.whether the "ordinary course" requirement is met.
The issue of when one becomes a buyer in ordinary course will not be
reached if the transaction is not in the ordinary course of the seller's business. However, the two inquiries are interrelated and the presence of the
latter may be determinative of the former. For example, if a transaction is
considered in the ordinary course, a court may also conclude that the buying
process has progressed sufficiently for purposes of U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See text
accompanying notes 38 & 49 infra. For purposes of this Note, it is assumed
that the requirements of U.C.C. § 1-201(9) have been satisfied and thus, the
inquiry is limited to a discussion of when a sale in the ordinary course of the
seller's business is sufficiently completed for the purchaser to achieve buyer
in ordinary course status.
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nary course.2 1
I.
A.

THE ALTERNATIVES

The Initial Contract Date

Section 9-307(1) does not expressly protect an "executory
buyer."22 However, the definitions of the terms "buyer" and
"seller" under article 2 of the Code arguably sanction the initial
contract date as the critical point for determining buyer in ordinary course status. Section 2-103(1) (a) defines "buyer" as "a person who buys or contracts to buy goods." 23 Similarly, "seller" is
defined in section 2-103(1) (d) as "a person who sells or contractsto
sell goods." 24 Additionally, section 2-106(1) provides that a "present sale" is "accomplished by the making of the contract.' 25 Thus,

under these provisions the mere exchange of promises 26 to buy
and sell goods may create an enforceable contract

27

which could

21. The question is open in Nebraska.
22. Skilton, supra note 4, at 15 (a buyer who has not yet completed the sale).
Article 2 provides a limited remedy for a buyer who has partially paid for
identified goods from an insolvent seller. Under U.C.C. § 2-502(1) such a
buyer may, upon tender of the unpaid portion of the purchase price, recover
the goods (even if unshipped) if the seller becomes insolvent within 10 days
after the first installment payment. Section 2-501(2) limits the buyer's recovery to goods which conform to the contract where identification is made
solely by the buyer. Although this section provides some mechanism for protecting a buyer's contractual interest in goods prior to completion of the sale,
it obviously affords no relief to the buyer who has not completed the sale nor
to the buyer whose seller becomes insolvent more than 10 days after initial
payment.
23. U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (a) (emphasis added).
24. Id. § 2-103(1) (d) (emphasis added).
25. Id. § 2-106(1) (emphasis added).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1973) defines a promise as "a

manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so
made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been
made."
27. U.C.C. § 2-204 contains very liberal contract formation rules:
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any mannersufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be
found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to
make a contractand there is a reasonablycertain basisfor giving an appropriateremedy.
(emphasis added).
"Agreement" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(3) as "the bargain of the parties
in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances
including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided by this Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208). Whether an agreement has legal
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give rise to buyer in ordinary course status under section 9-307(1).
At first blush, the selection of an initial contract date, at least in
the absence of identification of the goods to the contract may appear too early a date for establishing buyer in ordinary course status if a manageable application of section 9-307(1) is to be
maintained. For example, a secured party attempting to exercise
his default remedies under sections 9-501 to -507 will be uncertain
as to what, if any, collateral has been "sold" to a buyer in ordinary
course. Holding a bare agreement to buy and sell sufficient to trigger section 9-307(1), without the seller's recordkeeping or marking
or labeling as sold the collateral remaining in the seller's possession, will make it difficult for the secured lender to avoid infringing
upon the rights of purchasers of the collateral. However, the later
in the sale sequence such status is determined, the greater will be
the sacrifice of the buyer's (and seller's) legitimate expectations in
the transaction.
There is judicial authority for determining buyer in ordinary
course status based upon an initial contract date. 28 In Troy Lumber Co. v. Williams,2 9 the court, in dicta, indicated that if the
purchasing plaintiffs had attempted to enforce their agreement
with the seller to purchase an unspecified mobile home, they
would have qualified as buyers in ordinary course under section 9307(1). The plaintiffs had signed a '"proposal" with a mobile home
dealership, agreed to purchase an unidentified mobile home, and
made a $600 down payment. Shortly thereafter, the dealer's president absconded with all of the company's cash. Plaintiffs initiated
an attachment proceeding against one of the mobile homes on the
lot to satisfy their loss claiming they were buyers in the ordinary
consequences is determined by the provisions of this Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts...."
It should be noted that a contract for the sale of goods of $500 or more
requires a writing sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made and
must be signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. U.C.C. § 2-

201(1).

These provisions when read together sanction the statement that a bare
agreement to buy and sell which satisfies § 2-201 (1) would be a "contract"
within the Code's definition of the word and, even if oral, would be enforceable when less than $500.
28. See, e.g., Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile America Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 580 P.2d 8
(Ct. App. 1978); Troy Lumber Co. v. Williams, 124 Ga. App. 636, 185 S.E.2d 580
(1971) (dictum); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 392
N.E.2d 344 (1979); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261,288 N.Y.S.2d
525 (1968).
In contrast, "the commentators who have written on section [1-201(9)],
shed but confused elucidation on whether one can become a buyer in ordinary course merely by entering into a contract to buy." Chrysler Corp. v.
Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 239, 208 N.W.2d, 97, 106 (1973).
29. 124 Ga. App. 636, 185 S.E.2d 580 (1971).
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course of the seller's business. 30 The court disagreed, finding that
plaintiffs had become lien creditors of the seller and had
subordinated their claim to the manufacturer's perfected security
interest.3 ' Nevertheless, the court indicated the buyer in ordinary
course argument "would be a valid argument if the plaintiffs were
in fact buyers, i.e., if they were either attempting to enforce the contract of sale or defending their right tofree possession of the prop32
erty after having performed under the contract."
The court cannot be criticized for refusing to protect the purchasers' contract rights because they elected not to seek contractual remedies. However, the court suggested that the process of
buying has progressed sufficiently to support buyer in ordinary
course status when there has merely been partial payment under a
contract in unidentified goods.
Also sanctioning the initial contract date as determinative of
buyer in ordinary course status in unidentified goods, at least
where the buyer has fully performed, is Herman v. First Farmers
State Bank.33 The facts of Herman fall squarely within the Troy
Lumber dictum in which the court indicated that buyer in ordinary
course status would be found where buyers attempt to "defend
their right to free possession of the property after having per34
formed under the contract."
In Herman, the plaintiff, claiming buyer in ordinary course status, brought an action against the seller's inventory financer to recover her payment for the future delivery of 40,000 pounds of
unidentified 35 liquid nitrogen fertilizer. The defendant had seized
and sold all of the seller's inventory following the seller's default
under its financing agreement with the defendant. In finding for
the plaintiff, the court expressly rejected defendant's argument
that goods must be identified and that title must pass under section 2-401 before the plaintiff achieves buyer in ordinary course
status. The court stated the test as follows:
Whether the buyer is a buyer in ordinary course is not affected by

whether there has been a completed sale or merely the making of the contract to sell, since the fact that title has not yet been transferred as between the dealer and the purchaser does not prevent the latter from being
30. Id. at 636, 185 S.E.2d at 582.
[T] he plaintiffs have, in effect, rescinded this contract by demanding
31.
refund of their down payment. They are not asking for a mobile
home, they are asking for $600. That the sheriff levied upon a mobile
home which will be sold by execution to satisfy the debt, does not
make them buyers of the attached mobile home.
Id. at 637-38, 185 S.E.2d at 582.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
App. 3d 475, 392 N.E.2d 344 (1979).
33. 73 Ill.
34. 124 Ga. App. at 637-38, 185 S.E.2d at 582.
35. See U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (b).
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regarded as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, insofar as the secured creditor of the dealer is concerned where the transaction 3between
6
the dealer and the purchaser is ordinary or typical in the trade.

The court found that the transaction was customary in the seller's
business, that plaintiff had previously purchased fertilizer on the
same basis, and that plaintiff had fully performed by paying the
purchase price to the seller. Those factors led the court to conclude that plaintiff "justifiably expected delivery" and "was a typical buyer in an ordinary business transaction with [the seller]"
and thus was entitled to protection under section 9-307(1).37
The Herman decision suggests a further factor relevant to determining whether buyer in ordinary course status should be
deemed achieved upon the contract date. The court relied heavily
on the fact that the transaction was typical in the seller's business.
Although this finding is otherwise relevant to the "ordinary course
of business" requirement of section 9-307(1),38 the Herman court
utilized the "typical in the trade" nature of the transaction as a
factor in determining that the process of buying had progressed
sufficiently to warrant the conclusion that buyer in ordinary course
status had been achieved.
A similar result, although in a different context, was reached in
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp,39 where the court found that a contract to purchase identified4O goods with a partial down payment
by the purchaser was sufficient to achieve buyer in ordinary course
status. Chrysler Credit involved a dispute between an inventory
financer who held a "floating lien"41 in the seller's automobile inventory, and a retail installment creditor who had been assigned
chattel paper, 42 evidencing the right to receive installment payments, and a security interest in a car sold to defendant Mrs.
Sharp.43 Mrs. Sharp had signed a retail installment contract with
the seller for the purchase of the car. The contract recited as con36. 73 11. App. 3d at 479, 392 N.E.2d at 346 (quoting ANDERSON, UNiFORm CoMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201:25 (2d ed. 1970)). In light of the present case law perhaps
Anderson should delete the words "is not" and insert instead the words
"should not be."
37. 73 Il. App. 3d at 479, 392 N.E.2d at 346.
38. See note 20 supra.
39. 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 525. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
40. See note 53 infra.
41. See note 10 supra.
42. Section 9-105(1) (b) defines "chattel paper" as:
a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and
a security interest in or a lease of specific goods, but a charter or
other contract involving the use or hire of a vessel is not chattel paper. When a transaction is evidenced both by such a security agree-

ment or a lease and by an instrument or a series of instruments, the
group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper.
43. Mrs. Sharp apparently abandoned her rights following seizure and sale of the
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sideration a trade-in allowance for her old car and a cash down
payment of $443. The security interest was reserved until Mrs.
Sharp paid the balance of the purchase price. The retail creditor,

Chrysler Credit, paid the seller in full upon assignment of the chattel paper, but the seller failed to turn over the proceeds to the inventory financer. Although Mrs. Sharp traded in her old car,

contrary to the recital in the agreement and unbeknownst to
Chrysler Credit, she had not made the down payment but rather

had orally agreed with the seller's sales manager to make the payment upon receipt of an expected income tax refund. The inventory financer seized and sold the seller's inventory before Mrs.
Sharp made the down payment and took possession. Chrysler
Credit then brought a conversion action against the inventory
financer in which the right to the proceeds was at issue. The question of the buyer's status arose in this dispute because the retail
creditor's right to receive payments was believed to be grounded
on the buyer's status as a buyer in ordinary course. 44 The court
held for Chrysler Credit, concluding that since Chrysler had

purchased the chattel paper in due course for new value from the
seller, it was entitled to damages under sections 9-308(b) and 9306(5) (b), (c), and (d).
In holding for Chrysler Credit, the court noted it had also found
that Mrs. Sharp was a buyer in ordinary course. In addressing the
buyer in ordinary course issue, the court rejected the inventory
financer's argument that since the seller retained title to the car,
Mrs. Sharp was precluded from qualifying as a buyer in ordinary
course due to the passage of title rules of section 2-401. The court
stressed the apparent good faith intent of Mrs. Sharp to purchase
the automobile and the typicality of the transaction 45 in the seller's
car. Although she was made a party defendant she was never served with
process. 56 Misc. 2d at 262, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
44. Where the rights of a third party are dependent upon the buyer's qualification as a buyer in ordinary course, they have been referred to as "satellite
rights." Skilton, supra note 4, at 76-88.
45. With respect to the typicality of the transaction the court stated:
[I]t may be said that Mrs. Sharp entered into a specific written contract to purchase the car owned by the dealer. She gave valuable
consideration in goods, she traded in her old vehicle, and she signed
a binding installment contract. She agreed to pay in cash a down
payment and a deferred payment. By agreement, orally, she specified the course of her down payment, an anticipated income tax refund, and she certainly, in good faith expected to receive the car and
to make her payments upon the evidence (U.C.C. § 1-102(3)). According to the testimony, she attempted to pay her cash deficiency a
few days later after the repossession by the bank, but, finding the car
gone, abandoned her rights. The sales manager testified, without
contradiction, that they frequently took and negotiated contracts
with the car to be held for a time for the cash down payment, that it
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business and concluded:
The court feels a buyer who makes a purchase on a printed form in good
faith with a full understanding it is a binding contract, who knowingly
signs a retail installment payment obligation and trades in an old car in
addition must certainly as to a retail financer furnishing new value on the
strength of such contract and as to an entruster giving the dealer wide
latitude of sale goods [sic], be deemed a buyer in the ordinary course of
business, without regard to the technicalities of when title [passes]
46
6.

Although the court's holding adjudicated the rights of a retail creditor seeking a remedy against an inventory financer,47 it neverthewas common practice in his twenty years experience in the car business to take contracts without actual receipt of the recited cash down
payment. He said he would fire a salesman who failed to do so and
that in his experience and opinion a number of dealers would go out
of business if they failed to follow this practice.
56 Misc. 2d at 267, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 531-32.
46. Id. at 269-70, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 533-34.
The court discounted the inventory financer's argument that holding for
Chrysler Credit would place an undue burden upon inventory financers by
forcing them to exercise constant supervision over their debtor's disposition
of collateral held for sale. The court stated:
Any interpretation of the entire transaction, where both the retail
financer and bank entruster acted in good faith which became so
technical as to abort the intention of the Act and where a dealer has
acted in relation to all the other parties, buyer, entruster and
financer, in such a manner as to leave each with damage, would undermine the ultimate success of the Act. If there is a usage of trade
which exposes an entruster on floor plan to certain risks, these are
risks against which he can guard by audits and accounting procedures or he can refuse to knowingly expose himself to the risk with
the particular dealer. To fail to place the exposure of such a risk with
the entruster in such situation would make it impossible for retail
finance companies to do business with any dealer unless the entruster were directly a participant. To hold otherwise, would expose
the retail financer to a double loss as against at most a partial loss for
both. The proliferation of paper work would be a giant step backwards in modern commercial practice.
Id. at 269-70, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 534. Accord, Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile
America Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 580 P.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Services Co., 133 Ga. App. 488, 211
S.E.2d 430 (1974); Troy Lumber Co. v. Williams, 124 Ga. App. 636, 185 S.E.2d
580 (1978). See also notes 57 & 62 & accompanying text infra.
47. This point is critically discussed by Professor Skilton. See Skilton, supra
note 4, at 84-85. Skilton raises the question whether the court in Chrysler
Creditheld for the retail creditor because Mrs. Sharp was a buyer in ordinary
course or whether Mrs. Sharp was found to be a buyer in ordinary course
because the court held for the retail creditor. Skilton argues that the status
of the buyer should not control in a contest over chattel paper under these
facts. Id. at 79. He analyzes whether in determining the rights of an inventory financer and retail creditor in chattel paper it is necessary to determine
whether the buyer purchased the goods in a sale authorized by the inventory
financer or as a buyer in ordinary course. Id. at 85. He concludes that under
facts such as Chrysler Credit,where the retail creditor has acquired the chat-
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less recognized the existence of buyer in ordinary course status
upon formation of the contract and partial payment.
Troy Lumber, Herman, and Chrysler Credit48 would all support
the proposition that buyer in ordinary course status could be determined upon contract formation, at least where there has been
partial or full payment for the goods and the transaction is typical
in the seller's business. The question is raised whether a buyer
should be entitled to ordinary course status absent any payment
under the contract. There appears to be no valid reason for conditioning buyer in ordinary course status on the presence of a payment if the presence of a contract is to be the controlling factor.
Thus, if the buyer can demonstrate the existence of a valid contract 49 and that the transaction is typical in the seller's business,
the executory buyer should prevail against the seller's secured
tel paper for new value and the sale is either authorized or the purchaser is a
buyer in ordinary course, U.C.C. § 9-308 governs the outcome of the dispute.
Id.
U.C.C. § 9-308 (1962 version) provides:
A purchaser of chattel paper or a non-negotiable instrument who
gives new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of
his business and without knowledge that the specific paper or instrument is subject to a security interest has priority over a security interest which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing and
temporary perfection). A purchaser of chattel paper who gives new
value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business has priority over a security interest in chattel paper which is
claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest (Section 9-306), even though he knows that the specific paper is
subject to the security interest.
Id. The section was rewritten in 1972 for clarity and to place purchasers of
instruments on equal footing with purchasers of chattel paper. See U.C.C.
§ 9-308.
However, Skilton goes on to state that if the purchaser is not a buyer in
ordinary course and the sale is not authorized by the inventory financer, the
financer's security interest in the collateral continues notwithstanding sale.
Skilton, supra note 4, at 84-85. Thus, although U.C.C. § 9-308 would require
finding for the retail creditor in a dispute over rights to chattel paper, it would
not resolve a dispute between the inventory financer holding an original, continuing, perfected security interest in the collateral and the retail creditor
with a security interest in the goods as an assignee of the chattel paper. In
order to render judgment for the retail creditor in this situation, the purchaser must have either participated in an authorized sale or achieved buyer
in ordinary course status.
Despite the apparent validity of this reasoning, the courts have not generally recognized the distinction as to when the purchaser's status is dispositive. But see International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial
Services Co. 133 Ga. App. 488, 211 S.E.2d 430, 435-36 (1974) (noting the
distinction).
48. For a discussion of an alternative analysis under the ChryslerCredit case, see
note 47 & accompanying text supra.
49. See note 27 supra.
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lender as a buyer in ordinary course and be entitled to the goods
upon payment of the contract price.
The decision of Rex FinancialCorp. v. Mobile America Corp.50
provides support for this view. In Rex Financial,the court held
that a good faith intent to purchase a particular mobile home, as
evidenced by the buyers' execution of an installment purchase
agreement and a purchase money security agreement was sufficient to establish buyer in ordinary course status, even though the
buyers made no down payment and did not take possession of the
unit. The assignee of the seller, Mobile America, brought a conversion action against the seller's secured lender, Rex Financial, who
had seized and disposed of the collateral. 5 1 Rex Financial argued
that since the buyers5 2 neither took possession of the mobile home
nor made a down payment, Mobile America was precluded from
asserting that they were buyers in ordinary course. The court rejected this argument and held that Mobile America could recover
from Rex Financial the amount the former had paid the seller for
the purchase money security interest. The court concluded that
neither possession nor a down payment were necessary elements
in establishing buyer in ordinary course status and went on to hold
that a security agreement in favor of Mobile America attached
upon execution of the installment and security agreements.
The determination of buyer in ordinary course status upon the
initial contract formation date respects the legitimate transactional interest that the buyer has acquired in the goods, whether or
not identified5 3 to the contract. The buyer is allowed the benefit of
50. 119 Ariz. 176, 580 P.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1978).
51. Id. at 177, 580 P.2d at 9.
52. The buyers were not made parties to this litigation. Following the seller's
default under its inventory financing agreement with Rex Financial, all the
seller's inventory, including the mobile home, was seized and sold. The buyers apparently abandoned their contractual rights under the purchase agreement. Mobile America likewise abandoned efforts to collect the purchase
price from the buyers.
53. Although the goods were identified in Rex Financial and Chrysler Credit
there is no language in either case which indicates that the courts considered
identification necessary to buyer in ordinary course qualification. As stated
by the court in Herman v. First Farmers State Bank.
Defendant's attempts to distinguish Chrysler and Rex Financialare
without merit. Defendant argues that the purchased goods in those
cases were specific ones, which had been set aside or "identified" to
the contract under section 2-401 so as to complete the sale and pass
title to the buyer... However, we find nothing in either of those
opinions to suggest that the courts based their decisions on section 2401 or any of the other provisions of Article 2 relating to passage of
such an argument was
title and consummation of sales. In fact,.
specifically rejected in both cases.
App. 344, 346-47, 392 N.E.2d 344, 395 (1979) (citation omitted).
119 11M.
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his bargain, may pursue his contractual remedies,5 4 and, if specific
performance is available,5 5 may avoid the search for a comparable
transaction elsewhere. 56 Furthermore, this early recognition of
buyer in ordinary course status maximizes the seller's ability to
dispose of goods held for sale in the ordinary course of business.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that recognizing the rights of
an executory buyer "would make the entire concept of security on
inventory unworkable, placing on any inventory security holder
54. See generally, Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material BreachCommon Law Mitigation Rules, The UCC, and The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 47 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1 (1976). The buyer's potential remedies include damages or specific performance. The buyer's traditional measure of
damages for a seller's total breach of contract is the difference between the
market price and the contract price. J. CALAmu & J. PEMLLO, CONTRACTS
546-47 (1977). This rule has been codified in U.C.C. § 2-713(1), with the added
option of "cover," i.e., the buyer may make a good faith purchase or contract
to purchase substitute goods without unreasonable delay. See U.C.C.
§ 712(1). The buyer may then recover the difference between the cost of
cover and the contract price. Id. § 712(2). Thus, the buyer should receive the
difference between the market or cover price and the contract price. The
Code contains adequate safeguards to protect against unreasonable damage
awards. For example, U.C.C. § 1-106, Official Comment 1 makes "it clear that
damages must be minimized." Section 1-203 imposes an obligation of good
faith, and § 2-712(2) provides that the buyer's damages are reduced by the
amount of expenses saved due to the seller's breach.
Specific performance is available under the Code where the goods are
"unique or in other proper circumstances." U.C.C. § 2-716(1). The buyer is
granted replevin rights where specific performance is decreed "for goods
identified to the contract if after reasonable efforts he is unable to effect cover
for such goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will
be unavailing." Id. § 2-716(3).
A better result will be accomplished where the buyer resorts to an action
for specific performance. Here, the secured lender will not be left with a damage award following sale of the collateral. By enforcing the contract, the
buyer retains his transactional expectations and the secured lender recovers
at least a portion of his security interest through the § 9-306(2) right to proceeds. However, where the goods are sold before the buyer can specifically
enforce the contract, a damage award will be the buyer's only available remedy, provided the market or cover price is greater than the contract price.
55. See note 54 supra.
56. In many situations, a comparable sale cannot be found elsewhere, particularly where goods are identified or the buyer has agreed to purchase at a
favorable yet commercially reasonable price. Resolution of the remedies issue could be reasonably accomplished within the spirit of article 2 by liberalizing the interpretation of when goods are considered "unique" or "other
proper circumstances" are present to justify specific performance under
U.C.C. § 2-716. For example, a secured party's exercise of § 9-503 rights to
take possession of or render unusable the collateral of the seller would be
considered "other proper circumstances" sufficient to allow the buyer to specifically enforce the contract Section 2-716 was intended to expand the common law doctrine of specific performance of contracts of sale. U.C.C. § 2-716,
Official Comment 1.
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the impossible burden of accounting to numerous unknown creditors of the dealer who had made payments on account but never
received their goods."5 7 To this contention, there are three responses. First, the buyer has acquired contractual rights in the
goods in a transaction which is typical in the seller's business.
Thus it may be argued that the secured party has in effect "consented" to all transactions of this nature, and therefore has no
right to complain about a loss of his security interest in the collateral. Further, by extending credit to the seller, the secured party
contemplated that the security interest was retained in goods held
for sale.58 Thus, the secured party obtained a temporary interest
in "quasi-negotiable" goods.5 9 Where a security interest is retained in inventory, the primary source for satisfaction of the
seller's debt is the sales proceeds. The sale of goods in ordinary
course and the periodic payment of proceeds to the secured party
in order to obtain additional credit is facilitated by recognizing the
interrelationship between sections 9-307(1) and 9-306(2).
Second, these cases typically involve a double-dealing seller
who has improperly disposed of the sales proceeds in violation of
the financing agreement. 60 The inventory financer may well have
an indication of the seller's probable compliance with sound commercial practices prior to the extension of the credit. It may be
argued that the secured party should bear the loss for the conduct
57. Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d at 480, 392 N.E.2d at 347
(argument of defendant secured lender). However, by requiring the seller to
maintain complete records of all goods sold, the secured party may protect
himself from tort liability for conversion if he repossesses goods which, although remaining on the seller's premises, have been sold to a buyer in ordinary course. Thus, the secured party would be able to ascertain at any given
date the amount of collateral available to satisfy the secured obligation in the
event of default. Beyond this measure, the secured party may insist upon a
provision in the financing agreement requiring the seller to indemnify, by insurance or otherwise, the secured party in the event the foreclosure and sale
remedies are exercised against goods sold due to the seller's inaccurate and/
or incomplete recordkeeping.
58. In fact, the buyer's reliance on § 9-307(1) may be unnecessary because many
security agreements authorize the sale of the collateral "free and clear."
Skilton, supra note 4, at 88. Where the sale is authorized, the secured party
must relinquish its interest in the collateral and look to the identifiable proceeds since authorization of sale "in the security agreement or otherwise"
discontinues the security interest in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-306(2). However, a determination must be made that a "sale" has occurred. Thus, an inquiry, similar to that under section 9-307(1), is necessary to determine
whether the transaction has sufficiently progressed to constitute a "sale" for
purposes of section 9-306(2). Reference to article 2 may resolve this question
more easily than the buyer in ordinary course issue. See U.C.C. § 2-106(1)
("sale" is "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price").
59. Skilton, supra note 4, at 88.
60. See, e.g., Troy Lumber Co. v. Williams, 124 Ga. App. 636, 185 S.E.2d 580 (1971).
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of the seller with whom he has chosen to deal. Furthermore, the
inventory financer is in the best position to guard its interests by
inclusion of proper terms 61 in the financing agreement. 62 Such
protection should include requiring the seller to maintain accurate
and complete sales records, retaining the desired degree of control
over the collateral, and inquiring into the seller's compliance during performance of the financing agreement.
Third, the secured lender is not without remedy. Although it
would relinquish its interest in the collateral, it would have an interest in the proceeds under section 9-306(2) when the buyer pays
the purchase price under the contract. 63 Where the buyer is a
buyer in ordinary course, the buyer should be afforded the option
of either effecting a sale under his contractual agreement with the
seller by paying in the contract price to the secured party, or ob61. See note 57 supra. Within the confines of article 9 the parties to the security
agreement are otherwise free to elect:
(a) the kind of device or agreement to be used,
(b) the kind of collateral in which the security interest is created,
(c) the degree of protection (frequently including protection over
and above protection against lien creditors) to be afforded the
secured party,
(d) the degree of control by the creditor of the collateral left in possession of the debtor, and
(e) the amount of detail in the public notice to be given.
Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: PrioritiesAmong Secured
Creditorsand the "FloatingLien," 72 HAxv. L REv. 838, 846 (1959).
62. Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile America Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 580 P.2d 8 (Ct.
App. 1978) (inventory financer in better position to guard against risk of
financing than buyer or retail financer); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56
Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1968) (risks of usage of trade to which inventory financer is exposed by dealing with seller should be borne by secured
party). As stated by the court in Herman v. First Farmers State Bank*
We believe that the risks involved in situations such as that at bar
should be placed on the inventory financer, not only because it is better able to guard against those risks than the unwary buyer or retail
financer, but also because a contrary rule would inequitably allow
the inventory financer a double recovery.
73 Ml. App. 3d at 480-81, 392 N.E.2d at 346.
The court's reference to "double recdvery" is apparently based on the fact
that the secured party is already entitled to a security interest in the identifiable proceeds of the sale under U.C.C. § 9-306(2). Thus, to allow the financer
his § 9-306 interest plus the right to dispose of the seller's collateral and satisfy the security interest would constitute a "double recovery." Under the
Herman facts the seller had probably previously disposed of the proceeds of
plaintiff's sale beyond the reach of the secured party. Although a holding for
the defendant in that case would not actually effect a double recovery, it
would in a theoretical sense.
63. U.C.C. § 9-306(2). This section provides that a "security interest ... continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor."
Id. See note 58 supra.
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taining a refund of prior payments. 64 Upon the latter event, the
secured party would then exercise its foreclosure and sale remedies on the collateral. Thus, assuming the purchase price the
buyer would be required to pay or the amount the secured party
could recover from foreclosure and sale would be sufficient to satisfy the debt, the secured lender would be made whole. 65 If the
sale were for less than a fair price,66 if the seller retained possession of the goods without sufficient commercial justification,6 7 or if
the sale constituted a fraud against the secured creditor, 68 the secured party is not without alternative remedies.
Despite these considerations, it must be examined whether the
Code requires, or fairness to the inventory financer demands, that
goods be identified before an inventory fmancer's rights in the collateral are lost under section 9-307(1).
B.

The Identification Date

The second alternative for buyer in ordinary course status is
the identification date. The Code provides that identification has
occurred where there has been "identification of existing goods as
goods to which the contract refers."6 9 Typically, a dispute as to
whether goods are identified or not will arise only when the seller
has retained possession. Obviously, where the buyer has taken
possession, the goods will have been identified. Under U.C.C. section 2-501, upon identification of the goods the buyer acquires,
64. The impact on the secured lender would be more favorable in the absence of
partial payment assuming that any down payment could not be recovered
from the seller. If the purchaser had made no down payment and had sought
to enforce the contract to effectuate a sale, the full purchase price would have
remained unpaid. Thus, under section 9-306 (2), the secured party would have
obtained a security interest in thefull purchase price in order to satisfy the
seller's debt.
65. It is of course assumed that the original contract was the result of an armslength transaction resulting in a price at or about market value. One means
to guard against a "bargain contract" would be to include a term in the financing agreement prohibiting the sale of goods below a certain level without the
consent of the secured lender. This would prevent the possibility of the secured party having merely the proceeds of a bargain contract.
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1978); UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4-6.
67. See U.C.C. § 2-402(2) which provides:
A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods
to a contract for sale as void if as against him a retention of possession by the seller is fraudulent under any rule of law of the state
where the goods are situated, except that retention of possession in
good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale or identification is not
fraudulent
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1978); UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4, 7.
69. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).

19811

BUYER IN ORDINARY COURSE

(1) "a special property," and (2) "an insurable interest in
goods." 70 This is a sufficient interest to insure the goods and to
provide the buyer a cause of action against a third party who in7
jures the buyer through his dealing with the goods. 1
The fact that these rights accrue upon identification could support an argument that for section 9-307(1) purposes, the Code does
not recognize an enforceable contractual interest in goods prior to
identification and therefore a person cannot become a "buyer" until certain goods are specified as those to which the agreement refers. Thus, until the parties identify the goods, the Code does not
require a court to accord any special deference to the interest in
goods that a mere agreement to buy and sell would otherwise
create.
The force of this argument is undercut by the fact that under
section 2-501, identified goods need not conform to the contract,
and the buyer may have an option to accept or reject identified
goods.7 2 Further, identification may be made "at any time and in
any manner explicitly agreed to by the parties."73 Official Comment 2 to section 2-501 states that "[iun view of the limited effect
given to identification by this Article, the general policy is to resolve all doubts in favor of identification." 74
The view under article 2 of identification as a moment of decided unimportance should support the argument that identification should not serve so important a function as the determinative
moment at which a security interest in collateral is severed under
9-307(1). However, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
MartinMarietta Corp.v. New Jersey NationalBank 75 chose identification as the determinative date.
In Martin Marietta,the plaintiff-buyer brought a conversion action against the secured lender who, upon the seller's default
under the financing agreement, had taken possession of the
70. Id.
71. A typical example of such an injury would be conversion of the goods by a
third party. See U.C.C. § 2-722.
72. U.C.C. § 2-501(1). "[T]here is no requirement in this section that the goods
be in deliverable state or that all the seller's duties with respect to the
purchase of the goods be completed in order for identification to occur." Id.
Official Comment 4.
73. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
74. Id. § 2-501, Official Comment 2. The identification provisions of § 2-501 may
prove worthless to a secured party taking possession of a defaulting seller's
collateral which may have already been sold to a buyer in ordinary course
since identification can be made in any way agreed to by the buyer and seller.
Thus, it can be inferred that providing notice to the secured party of third
party interests in the collateral is not a purpose of identification. But see note

57 supra.
75. 612 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1979).
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seller's 62,000 ton inventory of sand and ordered its sale. The
plaintiff had orally contracted with the seller to purchase a large
quantity of sand per month. In holding that the defendant's security interest in the inventory should take precedence over the plaintiff's rights, the district court concluded: (1) the buyer's
attempted identification of the seller's inventory by placing signs
near the sand was insufficient to create a legally cognizable interest against the defendant; and (2) the buyer failed the good faith
requirement of section 1-201(9) by contracting to purchase with
seller solvent pending the buyer's decision
the intent to keep the
76
to acquire the seller.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court on the identification issue. The court first stated as a general proposition that
"where goods remain in the possession of the seller, the buyer cannot assert claims against third parties unless the goods are identified."77 The court then addressed the issue of whether the sand
which remained on the seller's lot had been sufficiently identified
to the contract by the signs placed near the sand by the buyer. The
court found that a buyer can identify goods under section 2-501
even though that section arguably frames identification in the context of the seller's activity.78 The court stated:
When a seller acquiesces by silence in the face of the buyer's clear assertion of ownership and then its subsequent course of conduct never indicates to the buyer that it feels the assertion of ownership was invalid, that
seller should not be able to say the goods were not designated merely because it did not personally place the signs. To elevate the phrase "designated by the seller" into an absolute requirement of positive physical
activity7by
the seller is to return to the formalism that the Code tries to
9
escape.

With respect to the identification of an undivided portion of a fungible mass, the court held that "Hollander [the seller] and the
plaintiff referred to a specific amount and mentioned the sand at
Hollander's New Jersey plant... [and if] the sand existed in Sep76. 612 F-2d at 748.
77. Id. at 749. However, the court found it unnecessary to decide the buyer in
ordinary course issue, since a remand was required to determine whether the
plaintiffs purchase fell within the bulk sales exclusion of the buyer in ordinary course definition. Under the U.C.C. § 1-201(9) buyer in ordinary course
of business definition, "buying ... does not include a transfer in bulk".
Unfortunately, the court's opinion gives no explanation as to why it was
"assuming without deciding this rule [identification under section 2-501]
would apply to a buyer's claim vis-a-vis an Article 9 secured creditor." 612
F.2d at 749.
78. U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (b) ("designated by the seller"). But see U.C.C. § 2-501(2) in
which the phrase "where the identification is by the seller alone" indicates
that the Code contemplates that identification may be performed by persons
other than the seller.
79. 612 F.2d at 750.
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tember, it was identified when the plaintiff and Hollander referred
to it in their oral contract."8 0 Thus, even without the buyer's
designation, the sand was identified by reference in the contract.
This illustrates the uncertainty 81 which may often surround the
question of whether goods have actually been identified. The court
further stated that with respect to a fungible mass, even if the
seller removes sand and later replaces it, the amount of sand referred to in the agreement remains identified for purposes of sections 2-501 and 9-307(1).82

In view of the very liberal policy favoring identification expressed in the Code and Martin Marietta, one may question the
utility of the identification date as a test for determining buyer in
ordinary course status. The fact that both buyer and seller are
able to identify may often result in confusion during the course of
a sale as to whether a party has manifested a sufficient intent to
identify the goods. The Code's attitude 83 toward identification bolsters the argument that it should not be the linchpin of buyer in
ordinary course determination. Furthermore, where a seller identifies without participation by the buyer, section 2-501(2) provides
that the seller may, prior to default, insolvency, or notification to
the buyer that the identification is final, substitute other goods for
those identified. Thus, unless one of the three contingencies'occurs, even a buyer of identified goods may be denied a sufficient
interest to compel the purchase of specific goods. This would
render an identification by the seller alone, under these circumstances, tantamount to no identification at all and further indicates
the minimal interest the buyer acquires upon identification.
Perhaps most importantly, there is nothing in the Code which
requires identification for purposes of resolving buyer in ordinary
80. Id. at 749 (emphasis added). U.C.C. § 2-501(1) provides that: "In the absence

of explicit agreement identificationoccurs (a) when the contract is made, if
it is for the sale of goods already existing and identified." (emphasis added).
The italicized portions indicate the circular nature of the identification definition. Thus, it is of little value in determining when identification of existing
goods occurs. But see U.C.C. § 2-501, Official Comment 5: "The mere making
of the contract with reference to an undivided share in an identified fungible
bulk is enough under subsection (a) to effect an identification if there is no
explicit agreement otherwise."
81. U.C.C. § 2-501, Official Comment 2 states: "It is possible ... for the identification to be tentative or contingent. In view of the limited effect given to identification by this Article, the general policy is to resolve all doubts in favor of
identification." Official Comment 4 states that: "In view of the limited function of identification there is no requirement in this section that the goods be
in deliverable state or that all of the seller's duties with respect to the
processing of the goods be completed in order that identification occur." Id.
Official Comment 4.
82. 612 F.2d at 750.
83. See note 81 supra.
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course status. A fair reading of section 2-501 indicates that identification impacts upon the rights of buyer and seller only, and was
not intended to sever the secured lender's interest in collateral.
Section 2-501 contains no requirement that the act of identification
be communicated to the secured lender. Thus, a secured lender
would not be apprised of the fact that certain loan collateral had
been freed of the security interest due to identification. Therefore,
little would be gained from the secured party's standpoint in fixing
identification as the determinative factor under section 9-307(1) for
buyer in ordinary course status. Unless notification of identification is provided to secured parties 84 and the buyer is informed of
his ability to identify, requiring identification to qualify as a buyer
in the ordinary course will prove a technical trap for the unwary
buyer, with the potential of frustrating justifiable transactional expectations in unidentified goods.
C. The Title Date
Those courts which have held that passage of title is necessary
to achieve buyer in ordinary course status85 have generally
reached this conclusion by referring to the Code's definition of
"sale" as "the passing of title from the buyer to the seller for a
price." 8 6 The facts of the dispute are then compared to the detailed passage of title rules of section 2-401 or to the parties' agreement to determine whether the purchaser has received title under
the contract. If so, the purchaser is a buyer in ordinary course and
takes free of the security interest. If not, the buyer is held to have
taken the goods subject to the security interest.
Conditioning buyer in ordinary course status on the passage of
title has the advantage of providing a manageable and predictable
method to resolve disputes between a buyer and his seller's secured lender. Passage of title normally will occur late in the sales
transaction. Unless otherwise expressly agreed by the parties, "title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller
completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery
of the goods."87 The later the title passes, the longer the secured
lender will retain the security interest in the goods.
It should be noted, however, that there is no requirement in the
Code that a purchaser obtain title to qualify as a buyer in ordinary
course of business. On the contrary, the Code contains express
84. See Section III infra.
85. See, e.g., Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 868,
396 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1977); Levine v. Ficke, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1059 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968); Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973).

86. U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
87. Id. §2-401(2).
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antipathy to the use of section 2-401 as a general problem solver. 88
Despite these sentiments, the passage of title rules have received
serious consideration by some courts in resolving the buyer in ordinary course issue. 89 As will be seen, however, reliance on the
passage of title rules may result in extreme hardship to the purchaser of collateral.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc.,90 the buyer (Chrysler) contracted with the seller (Adamatic) for the purchase of custommanufactured equipment and, under a prepayment agreement,
substantially paid the contract price prior to completion of its manufacture. Chrysler was aware of Adamatic's shaky financial situation and that its inventory was subject to a perfected security
interest. Upon Adamatic's insolvency, Chrysler obtained the
equipment (in various stages of completion) under a pre-judgment
writ of replevin. The secured lender intervened, claiming a perfected security interest in the goods and disputing Chrysler's claim
that it was a buyer in ordinary course of the equipment. In holding
Chrysler liable to the lender, the court noted that the definitional
language of section 1-201(9) "when reasonably construed, limits
buying in ordinary course of business to those situations where a
'sale' defined by [section 2-106(1)] as the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price, has occurred." 91 The court fofnd
88. U.C.C. § 2.401, Official Comment 1 states that the passage of title rules "in no
way alter the rights of either the buyer, seller, or third parties declared elsewhere in the Article." The title rules are said to be stated "in case the courts
deem any public regulation to incorporate the defined term of the 'private'
law." Id. Thus it appears that the proper imposition of an income, property,
or sales tax may depend on the passage of title but that the rights of parties to
a sales transaction under the Code are not governed by passage of title. Official Comment 1 further states: 'this Article deals with the issues between
seller and buyer in terms of step by step performance or non-performance
under the contract for sale and not in terms of whether or not 'title' to the
goods has passed." Id. Use of the concept of title is also minimized under
article 9. U.C.C. § 9-202 provides: "Each provision of this Article w'ith regard
to rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the
secured party or the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-202, Official Comment restates and
explains this provision as follows: '"The rights and duties of the parties to a
security transaction and of third parties are stated in this Article without reference to the location of 'title' to the collateral" Id.
Although this provision shows an intent to downplay the concept of title
under article 9, it may be argued that it pertains only to title in the collateral
and thus does not apply to the question of whether a buyer of the collateral
must have title in order to qualify as a buyer in ordinary course of business.
But see U.C.C. § 9-101, Official Comment which states broadly that: "Rights,
obligations and remedies under the Article do not depend on the location of
the title.. .. "
89. See UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE LAw LETTRI, supra note 14, at 1-2.
90. 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973).
91. Id. at 239, 208 N.W.2d at 106.
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that title had not passed to Adamatic under the contract since the
parties intended delivery to be an integral part of the title-passing
process.
Additionally, the court relied on section 2-402(3) (a) which
states that "[n] othing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the
rights of creditors of the seller (a) under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions ... ."92 Thus, the court found:
"Chrysler must either return the goods or account for their value;
and under [section 9-502(2)] Lakeshore [the secured lender] is obligated to account to the receiver, as the successor to Adamatic, for
so much of the value of the goods as exceeds Lakeshore's
93
interest."
The court's result is harsh in view of the fact that Chrysler had
substantially paid the contract price. The court noted that from an
equitable standpoint the result was unsatisfactory since Adamatic
had remitted Chrysler's progress payments to the secured lender
as they were made. 94 This double-recovery result has been criticized as follows:
With regard to giving the secured party the full value of the collateral
without deduction for its receipt of progress payments: section 9-306(2)
provides that in the case of unauthorized disposition by the debtor the
security interest continues in the original collateral and also continues "in
any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor."
While nothing is said about the need for the secured party to elect between following the original collateral, and going after the proceeds, it
seems9 fair
to hold that the secured party should not have his cake and eat
5
it too.

It may be stated then that under the Chrysler holding, title
must have passed to the buyer either under the contract or by delivery of the goods before the buyer will become a buyer in ordinary course under section 9-307(1). The fact that a buyer may have
had replevin rights or that the goods have been previously identified96 will not suffice, even where substantial payment has been
92. Id. at 241, 208 N.W.2d at 107.
93. Id. at 243, 208 N.W.2d at 108. In another portion of the opinion, unrelated to
the scope of this Note, the court held Chrysler entitled to other delivered
equipment although the equipment had been returned to Adamatic for additional refinement under a bailment agreement. The court noted that
Chrysler's initial possession constituted an acceptance and that Chrysler had
not revoked its acceptance or rejected the goods by redelivering the goods to
Adamatic for adjustment. Id. at 235-36, 208 N.W.2d at 104-05.
94. Id. at 241,208 N.W.2d at 108. "From the viewpoint of equity, this is an unsatisfactory result, for the record shows that, prior to the replevin, Chrysler had
substantially paid the contract price for all the goods involved." Id.
95. Skilton, supra note 4, at 17 n.50.
96. See U.C.C. § 2-501(b) (identification of future goods occurs when "shipped,
marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to which the contract
refers.") Although the court, in Chrysler, expressed some doubt, there seems
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made.
However, the court did suggest that a financing buyer could
avoid this precarious situation by arranging with the secured
lender to subordinate the secured lender's security interest in the
goods. 97 This raises an important, related question as to whether
the buyer and seller could agree to identify and pass title prior to
the times otherwise provided under sections 2-501 and 2-401 and
escape the Chrysler result. In reference to this question, one commentator has stated: "It is perfectly clear, for example, that the
parties may agree that completion of conforming goods by the
seller results in both identification and passage of title [under sections 2-401(1) and 2-501(1) ]. The emergence of the buyer's posses'
sory remedies can perhaps be accelerated by this. 98

It is especially important to provide for early identification
under section 2-501 since section 2-401(1) states that "[t]itle to

goods cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to their identifica-

tion to the contract." 99 While apparently a buyer and seller could
contractually agree to early identification and passage of title, a
different question is presented where early identification and passage of title are intended to affect rights of secured parties. It has
been stated that:
The real question is the effect of this agreement on third parties who assert claims to the same goods. The short answer is that unless the requirements of article 9 are met the agreement will have no effect.
Why is this so? Although not expressly stated in section 1-102(3), there
is little doubt that seller and buyer cannot by agreement impair or destroy
the rights of third persons not parties to the contract .... Further, although a "special property" interest under article 2 does afford some protection to the "financing" buyer's credit or interest, there is a point at
which the use of the property interest to achieve security results becomes
improper. That point is reached where the "special property" interest is
asserted in a way that conflicts with rights given to creditors and purchasers under article 2 or other provisions of state law. Beyond this point, the
planned transaction arranged exclusively under article 2 is ineffectual
Thus, in order to create a security interest in goods which will be effective
against the seller and third parties, the "financing" buyer must meet the
requirements of article 9.100

This reasoning would seem to be equally applicable to the
nonfinancing buyer who makes an agreement with the seller for a

97.
98.
99.
100.

to be no question that the goods were indeed identified, since the progress
payments depended upon the completion of certain stages of manufacture.
This appears to be an obvious identification by the buyer and seller.
59 Wis. 2d at 242, 208 N.W.2d at 108.
Speidel, Advance Payments in Contractsfor Sale of Manufactured Goods: A
Look at the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CALI. L. RE v. 281, 290-91 (1964).
U.C.C. § 2-401(1).
Speidel, supra note 98, at 291.
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contractual term' 0 ' which provides for identification and passage
of title intended to affect rights between the parties and secured
creditors.102 However, in the more typical nonfinancing buyer scenario, the buyer claiming free ownership of the goods as a buyer in
ordinary course is not attempting to create a security interest in
the goods. Rather, he is merely claiming that under section 9307(1) he has taken the goods free of the secured party's rights in
03
the collateral.
To say that a "special property" interest is ineffectual if as101. It.may also be possible to accelerate the passage of title by reference to a
custom or usage of trade. But see Doppelt v. Wander & Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 503 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976) (holding that proof of an alleged custom and
usage among jewelry dealers that a sale is complete and that title is considered to pass when a buyer indicates to the seller that he is buying the merchandise is inadmissible to contradict the plain and unambiguous terms of
the agreement).
102. In Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile America Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 176-77, 580 P.2d
89, (Ct. App. 1978), the court ignored a provision in the purchase agreement
which recited that "even though physical delivery of the [mobile] home
might not be made until a later date, title to the home passed to the [buyers]
as of the signing of the security agreement."
103. Conversely, as an inventory financing planning option, there seems to be no
direct Code prohibition to an inventory financer's insistence that the seller
covenant to include a provision in all purchase agreements that a purchaser
does not acquire an interest for § 9-307(1) purposes until a certain point in
the sale sequence, i.e., contract date, identification, title passage, delivery,
etc. Thus, the risk of loss under § 9-307(1) due to the seller's default would be
shifted to the executory buyer, leaving him with a claim against the seller to
recover partial payment under the contract.
Limitation of the prospective purchaser's § 9-307(1) rights until an ascertained point in the sale sequence under the above circumstances is distinguishable from the situation in which the buyer and seller unilaterally agree
to accelerate buyer in ordinary course status. As the secured lender is not a
party to this acceleration agreement, it is deprived, without assent, of vested
rights against purchasers of the collateral under § 9-201. However, where the
seller and a prospective purchaser contractually agree to limit buyer in ordinary course status to a certain point in the sale sequence, the purchaser is
surrendering only a potential right which would not vest until buyer in ordinary course status is otherwise achieved under state law. Thus, the purchaser agrees only to a postponement of that status.
Where there is no case law which sanctions the practice, it appears that
the buyer and seller would have wide discretion to contractually provide for
the point at which buyer in ordinary course status is achieved under § 9307(1). But see U.C.C. § 1-102(3) which provides:
The provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as
otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may
not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement
determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.
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serted to conflict with the rights of the seller's creditors' 0 4 merely
restates rather than resolves the problem. Conflict between the interests of secured creditors and purchasers of collateral is inherent
in the operation of section 9-307(1). At some point, the secured
party must surrender its security interest in the collateral in favor
of the purchaser and look to the proceeds under section 9-306(2).
Thus, the proper inquiry is not how to avoid conflict between the
buyer in ordinary course and the seller's secured lender but rather
how to seek a fair accomodation between these competing interests within the letter and spirit of the Code.
So where does this leave a purchaser of collateral if he may not
accelerate identification and passage of title to protect himself
against the holder of a perfected security interest? The harsh result reached in Chrysler and in other jurisdictions' 05 which have
adopted passage of title as the determinative point for buyer in ordinary course status may be criticized in several ways. First, nowhere in the Code is there any indication that passage of title is
necessary to achieve buyer in ordinary course status. Second, reliance on the acquisition of title is objectionable on the ground that
it imposes an artificial barrierlO6 between the transactional expectations of the parties and commercial reality. It bears no reasonable relationship to buyer and seller expectations that a sale has
been consummated and that the goods "belong" to the buyer.O?
These expectations are not diminished merely because the purchaser is pursuing contractual remedies against a seller, his creditor, or his trustee in bankruptcy. 0 8 Two examples will serve to
illustrate the absurdity of extinguishing a purchaser's contractual
rights in favor of a secured lender for the reason that there has not
been a passage of title either by agreement of the parties or under
section 2-401. Consider the situation where a buyer has purchased
goods subject to a perfected security interest and, in violation of
the agreement between the buyer and seller, the seller, prior to
default and foreclosure, has inadvertantly failed to place the goods
on his shipping dock as agreed upon under the contract.109 The
Code would mandate holding for the secured lender because, absent explicit agreement by the parties, title could not have passed
for "the seller has not complete[d] his performance with reference
104. Speidel, supra note 98, at 291.
105. See Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 868, 396
N.Y.S.2d 319 (1977); Levine v. Ficke, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1059 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968); Gordon, The PrepayingBuyer: Second Class Citizenship under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, 63 Nw. U. L REv. 565, 586-87 (1968).
106. Gordon, supra note 105, at 586-87.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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to the physical delivery of the goods." 11o Or suppose that the parties expressly agreed that title was to remain in the seller until full
payment for the goods was made, and that the buyer, as in
Chrysler, has paid nearly all of the purchase price. If the seller
defaults or becomes insolvent and the buyer cannot otherwise
meet the requirements of sections 2-502 or 2-716 the buyer, not
vested with title, will lose his interest in the collateral to the
seller's secured lender.
In both examples, applying a passage of title test and allowing
the secured party to obtain the collateral would contravene the
Code's policy of liberal construction"' in order "to simplify, clar2
ify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions.""
This policy would be furthered in example one by allowing the
purchaser to obtain the goods and require the secured lender to
resort to the proceeds under section 9-306(2).113 And, as in example two, where a buyer has partially paid the purchase price under
a contract for the sale of goods, he should be given the choice to
either pursue appropriate remedies against the secured party to
recover the amount already paid or pay in the remaining balance
and preserve his rights in the goods, provided the transaction is
ordinary or typical in the seller's business.
Two additional considerations suggest that the passage of title
rules should not determine buyer in ordinary course status. First,
in the usual scenario where a purchaser and a secured party are
embroiled in litigation over the buyer in ordinary course issue, it is
the conduct of the seller, with whom the secured lender has chosen to deal at the risk of default or insolvency, whose conduct has
brought about the dispute.114 Second, under the "ordinary course
of business" language of section 1-201(9),115 the proper inquiry is
whether the seller's transaction with the buyer was in the ordinary
course of the seller's business. Where the seller's disposition of
the goods conforms to the seller's ordinary course of business, the
secured lender should not be "unjustly enriched"" 6 through
double recovery by claiming a security interest in the goods and
the proceeds of amounts already paid. The artificiality and techni110. U.C.C. § 2-401(2).

111. U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. § 1-102(2) (a).
See notes 63-68 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 60-62 & accompanying text supra.
See note 20 & text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
Equity is another ground which may be invoked to protect the buyer of collateral. Under the provisions of U.C.C. § 1-103, the drafters of the Code intended
to reintroduce the general use of equitable principles into the law governing
commercial transactions. See DePaulo v. Williams Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc. 3
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 604 (Lebanon, Pa. C.P. 1966).
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cality inherent in the title rules create a situation contrary to the
spirit of promoting commercial
transactions which is evident
7
throughout the Code."
D. The Delivery and Acceptance Date
One area of judicial agreement in the buyer in ordinary course
issue is that delivery and thus possession are unnecessary to qualify, even when passage of title is deemed the determinative
point." 8 Passage of title does not depend upon transfer of possession.1 9 Under the acceptance provisions of section 2-606, there is
no provision for acceptance of title since, as Official Comment 2
states, "acceptance of title is not material under this Article to the
detailed rights and duties of the parties." 2 0 Since there are no
particularly compelling reasons for refusing to recognize buyer in
ordinary course at much earlier stages of the transaction, there is
much less reason for conditioning buyer in ordinary status upon
delivery or acceptance.'21
117. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(1)-(2).
118. See Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile America Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 177, 580 P.2d 8,
10 (Ct. App. 1978); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Services Co., 133 Ga. App. 488, 496, 211 S.E.2d 430, 434 (1974); Herman v.
First Farmers State Bank, 73 lL App. 3d 475, 476, 392 N.E2d 344, 345 (1979);
Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 868, 869, 396
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1977); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 269,
288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (1968); Levine v. Ficke, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1059, 1060
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 241, 208
N.W.2d 97, 107 (1973).
119. See U.C.C. § 2-401(2).
120. U.C.C. § 2-606, Official Comment 2.
121. However, one commentator has concluded that one cannot be a buyer in ordinary course prior to taking delivery of the goods. This conclusion was
reached through analogy to U.C.C. § 9-301(1) which provides that where a secured party attempts to enforce his security interest against a buyer of the
collateral, a buyer will defeat an unperfected security interest only if the
buyer obtains possession. The author concludes that under U.C.C. § 2-402
(which generally provides for the rights of a buyer in the ordinary course of
business who takes from a seller of entrusted goods) and U.C.C. § 2-403(2)
(which empowers a seller to transfer all rights of an entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course), a buyer must obtain possession before becoming a buyer in
ordinary course. See Smith, Title and the Right to Possession Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 B.C. INDus. CoM. L. REv. 39, 60-61 (1968). The analogy seems a bit strained. Initially, it should be noted that U.C.C. § 2-403(2)
makes no mention of possession as a requirement for a buyer of entrusted
goods to qualify as a buyer in ordinary course. Further, U.C.C. § 9-301 deals
not with a buyer in ordinary course of business but rather "a person who is
not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in
ordinary course of business." U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (c) (emphasis added). Thus,
U.C.C. § 9-301 should not be applicable to a determination of the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course of business under U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See Chrysler
Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219,230,208 N.W.2d 97, 107 (1973) where the
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III. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Under the present Code, where a buyer has contracted for a
sale from inventory, the buyer should take free of a secured
lender's perfected security interest in the collateral where the
transaction is ordinary or typical in the seller's business. This result fairly accomodates the transactional expectations of the buyer
and seller as well as the secured party's interest in goods held for
sale in the ordinary course of the seller's business.
However, the most satisfactory resolution of the buyer in ordinary course issue may lie in an amendment to the Code. The present judicial tendency to resolve this issue under article 2 has
provided secured parties and purchasers of collateral with little
more than inconsistent decisions to answer the question of when
the rights of a buyer in ordinary course attach under section 9307(1). Utilization of article 2 concepts, beyond contract formation,
is unsatisfactory in part because of the arbitrary manner in which
section 9-307(1) disputes are resolved and also because of the absence in article 2 of any express guidance beyond the general concepts of contract formation, identification, and title. Harsh and
inconsistent results can be expected to continue where the selection and application of rules can be supported by little more than
their ease of application to varying factual circumstances.
There is some force to the view that a foreclosing secured
lender should not incur liability to executory buyers in repossessing a defaulting seller's inventory. This is particularly compelling
where consulting the seller's business records or inspecting the inventory would not inform the secured lender of the outstanding
interests in collateral possessed by executory buyers. The ability
to readily make such a determination is important, for where the
secured party frustrates the transactional expectations of an execthe
utory buyer and the buyer initiates a conversion action against
2
secured party "[a] mistake of fact or law is no defense."12
Utilizing language patterned after that in sections 9-501 to -507,
the Code could be amended 23 to provide that a contract which
court stated: "Smith, in his article,... concludes, however, that one cannot
be a buyer in ordinary course prior to taking delivery of the goods. It seems
clear that ...
status as a buyer in ordinary course will not be defeated
merely because [the buyer] has not taken possession."
122. W. PROSSE, THE LAW OF TORTS 83 (4th ed. 1971).
123. Section 1-201(9) would be amended to read as follows:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods
contracts to buy from a person in the business of selling goods of that
kind but does not include a pawnbroker.
Section 9-307(1) would be amended to read:

BUYER IN ORDINARY COURSE
meets the requirements of both article 2 and applicable state law is
sufficient to allow the purchaser to take collateral free of a security
(1) A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of
section 1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest
created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence; provided, the
buyer has contracted to buy the goods and
(a) records kept in the ordinary course of the seller's business
reasonably available to the secured lender; or
(b) marking or labeling by the buyer or seller of goods which
constitute the subject matter of the transaction
would apprise a reasonably prudent secured lender exercising ordinary care that the goods are subject to the contractual interest of a
buyer;
(2) Under subsection (1), if the secured party would not be so
apprised of a buyer's contractual interest, the secured party shall not
be liable to a buyer who has contracted to buy the goods against
which the secured party has exercised the remedies provided under
Part 5 of this Article; provided, that where the secured party has
(a) actual knowledge of a buyer's contractual interest in the
goods; or
(b) a reasonably prudent secured party exercising ordinary care
under subsection (1) (a) or (b) would be apprised of the
buyer's contractual interest
the secured party shall, prior to disposition of the collateral, conduct
reasonable efforts to notify such buyers that the goods are subject to
the secured party's rights to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
collateral pursuant to Part 5 of this Article and that the goods may be
taken free of the security interest upon written notification of demand therefor and tender of the unpaid balance of the purchase
price within a reasonable time following such notification efforts. If
requested by the secured party, the holder of a contractual interest
must seasonably furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless
he does so, the secured party need not comply with his demand.
(3) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default and after a reasonable time since notification efforts have been
made by the secured party where required under this section and
where no buyer has made written notification of demand and tender
under subsection (2) within a reasonable time after such notification
efforts, the buyer shall have no right to recover from the secured
party for any loss or damages caused by such disposition. Such disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the buyer's rights
therein and the purchaser takes free of such rights even though the
secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this section,
or of any judicial proceedings
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured party, other bidders, or the person
conducting the sale; or
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
(4) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in
accordance with the provisions of this section disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occured in violation of the provisions of this section any
person entitled to reasonable notification efforts prior to the disposition has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by
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interest, provided, that upon the seller's default, records kept in
the ordinary course of the seller's business, or markings or labelings of the inventory would inform a reasonably prudent secured
lender that the goods have been "sold" for section 9-307(1)
124
purposes.
Prior to exercising his rights under part 5 of article 9, the secured lender would have the opportunity to inspect the seller's
records and inventory to determine the amount of collateral available to satisfy the secured debt. Accordingly, the secured lender
would act at his own peril in seizing and selling inventory without
first conducting a reasonable inquiry to determine whether the collateral was subject to the contractual interests of an executory
buyer. If the secured lender has actual knowledge of the contractual interests of executory buyers or in the exercise of ordinary
care would, upon inspection of the seller's records and inventory,
be so apprised, the secured lender must make reasonable efforts to
notify the buyers that the goods are subject to the secured lender's
interest.
The proposed amendment provides a purchaser of collateral
special protection from a secured party and provides that a secured party shall not be liable for claims by the buyer if the secured party complies with the reasonable notification requirement
and a reasonable time has passed prior to disposition of the collateral. The buyer has the burden of establishing a valid contract
with the seller and is given the opportunity, within a reasonable
time following the secured party's notification efforts, to enforce
his original contract by making demand and tendering payment of
the remaining contract price to the secured party. If the buyer
does not choose to do so, the secured party may sell, lease, or
otherwise dispose of the goods, free of liability to an executory
buyer.
The above changes to sections 1-201(9) and 9-307(1) strike a fair
balance between the competing interests of the buyer and secured
party in the collateral. The buyer can protect his contractual interest in the collateral by marking or labeling the goods to supplement, or in cases of insufficient sales records, in place of, the
seller's records. A buyer who wishes to pursue his contractual ina failure to comply with the provisions of this section and where not
prohibited by law, reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses.
(5) What is "reasonable" under this section shall depend upon
all the facts and circumstances including the nature, character and
quality of collateral subject to the contractual interest of a buyer and
whether the collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily
in value.
124. Thus, a buyer who "contracts to buy goods" would qualify as a buyer in ordinary course. See U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1) (a), 1-201(11).
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terest in the seller's inventory may do so by making written demand and tender of the unpaid balance to the secured party within
a reasonable time after notification efforts. The diligent secured
party may exercise his foreclosure and sale remedies free from the
fear of liability to an otherwise unaccounted for purchaser of the
collateral.
IV. CONCLUSION
The question of when a purchaser of goods which serve as collateral for a loan qualifies as a buyer in ordinary course of business
is too important a question to leave to determination by the courts
without express guidance by the drafters of the Code. The decisions are far from agreement as to when the process of buying has
progressed sufficiently for a purchaser to have achieved this protected status. The critical point at which buyer in ordinary course
status is determined should reflect a consideration of which party
is best able to bear the risk of its commercial dealings and which,
in fairness, should bear that risk. Under the present Code, the
seller's secured lender is that party. The choice of protecting an
innocent purchaser's transactional expectations in the ordinary
course of the seller's business should be held paramount to the
secured lender's interest in collateral held for sale.
Under the present Code, if the parties have contracted to buy
and sell in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the
transaction is typical in the seller's business, the security interest
in goods should be severed under section 9-307(1) and the buyer
should be entitled to the goods free of the ownership claims of the
secured lender. However, a better balance between the buyer's
and secured lender's interests can be struck by adoption of the
proposed Code amendments. Under the proposal, both parties are
afforded the opportunity to protect their transactional expectations by dealing diligently with the seller and the collateral and
without unduly restricting commercial activities.
Through both the suggested interpretation of the Code and the
proposed amendment, section 9-307(1) properly operates as a
buyer protection mechanism125 and promotes the Code's spirit of
free-flowing commercial transactions. The added administrative
burdens on the inventory financing industry are reasonable and, in
the long run, will serve to better protect the legitimate concerns of
all interested parties.
John R. Hughes '82
125. See Skilton, supra note 4, at 88.

